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II INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
DIEGO RODRIGUEZ-PINZoN
1. INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The individual complaint procedure of the Inter-American System is currently
experiencing a profound transformation due to recent changes in the Rules of
Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR or
Commission) and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (Court). Article 44 of
the New Rules of the IACHR, which indicates that all cases decided by the
Commission under the American Convention on Human Rights will be submitted to
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights,' has significantly modified the type of
case law of the Commission as well as its role within the individual complaint
structure of the Inter-American System.
One of the most noticeable changes is related with its standard setting function,
which the Commission has exercises mainly in cases brought under the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 2 However, it is possible to find
admissibility cases in which important substantive standards may be developed.
Below we are including a summary of the relevant parts of a recent decision in the
merits under the American Declaration against Belize, of a decision in the merits
againstJamaica still under the American Convention,3 and we are also including one
admissibility decision that has standard setting characteristics regarding freedom of
expression.
Article 44 states: Referral of the Case to the Court. 1. If the State in question has accepted the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court in accordance with Article 62 of the American Convention,
and the Commission considers that the State has not complied with the recommendations of the
report approved in accordance with Article 50 of the American Convention, it shall refer the case to
the Court, unless there is a reasoned decision by an absolute majority of the members of the
Commission to the contrary. 2. The Commission shall give fundamental consideration to obtaining
justice in the particular case, based, among others, on the following factors: a) the position of the
petitioner; b) the nature and seriousness of the violation; c) the need to develop or clarify the case-
law of the system; d) the future effect of the decision within the legal systems of the Member States;
and, e) the quality of the evidence available.
2 The Commission receives complaints under the Declaration against those States that have not yet
ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. In these cases, the final decision in the merits
is taken by the Commission, because the Court is only available to States that have ratified the
Convention and accepted its contentious jurisdiction.
3 Jamaica ratified the American Convention but has only accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the
Court for inter-State applications. Therefore, the Commission cannot submit to the Court cases
againstJamaica, so the proceedings end in the Commission's final decision in the merits.
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 23/1 (2005) 109
Human Rights News
Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District of Belize, Case 12.053, Report
No. 40/04, Merits, 12 October 2004
Facts/Background
Environmental Damage
In this case the petitioners claim that the State has violated Articles I, II, III, VI, XI,
XVIII, XX, XXIII in respect to lands traditionally used and occupied by the Maya
people by granting logging and oil concessions in and otherwise failing to protect
those lands, failing to recognise and secure the territorial rights of the Maya people
in those lands, failing to afford the Maya people judicial protection of their rights
and interests in those lands due to delays in court proceedings instituted by them.
The Maya people have formed organised societies that inhabited the Toledo
District of southern Belize and the surrounding region long before any Europeans
and its colonial institutions arrived which eventually created the modern State of
Belize. There exist distinct linguistic subgroups and communities among these Maya
people that have evolved within a system of interrelationships and cultural
affiliations. The land use practices of the Maya people are comprised of both
subsistence and cultural elements that form a foundation for the life and continuity
of the Maya communities. The Maya use land and streams surrounding the Maya
villages for dwelling and subsistence purposes as well as agriculture, hunting,
fishing, gathering and transportation activities. Numerous sites throughout the
agricultural area and the more remote forested lands are also regarded as sacred and
used for ceremonial purposes and burial grounds. The Mayas claim that there are
three principal zones surrounding the Maya villages: the 'village zone' that typically
extends to two square kilometres and is used for dwellings, raising fruit and other
trees and grazing livestock; the 'agriculture zone' extending up to 10 kilometres
from the village centre where crops are planted on a rotational system and a broader
zone that includes large expanses of forest lands and waterways used for hunting and
gathering for food, medicinal, construction, transportation and other purposes.
The customary land use patterns of the Maya people are governed by a traditional
land tenure system by which Maya villages hold land collectively, while individuals
and families enjoy subsidiary rights or use and occupancy.
This system exists alongside a system of 'reservations' established by the British
colonial administrations that pertains to Maya villages and that continues to exist
under the laws of Belize. But the Maya people note that the reservations include only
about one-half of the Maya villages in the Toledo District and that the customary
land tenure patterns of the Maya communities extend well beyond the reservation
boundaries.
According to a map provided by the State of Belize, a majority of the lands to
which the Maya people claim rights are designated 'National Land' and that the
Government only recognises the Maya people's rights to the reservations. The State
of Belize has continued to authorise and promote development activities on these
'National Lands' to which the Maya claim rights, without agreement or consultation
with the Maya communities and without accommodations for Maya resource use and
cultural patterns affected by this development.
The Government has granted logging and oil concessions on the Maya lands in
the Toledo district without meaningful consultations with the Maya. These
concessions have caused substantial environmental harm and threatens long term
and irreversible damages to the natural environment upon which the Maya depend.
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Since 1993, the State of Belize has granted numerous concessions for logging on
a total of over half a million acres of land in the Toledo District, including sizeable
concessions granted to two Malaysian Timber companies, Toledo Atlantic
International and Atlantic Industries. The Maya claim that logging under these
concessions is ongoing or imminent and that the areas of ten of the concessions
include reservation and non-reservation lands that are traditionally used and
occupied by the Maya people. The petitioner further claims that none of the
affected Maya villages agreed to any of the logging concessions and that no
meaningful consultations with the Maya people preceded the granting of the
concessions. The petitioners further claim that there is no indication the
Government considered Maya land use patterns or cultural practices in the affected
areas when they granted these concessions.
In May 2001, the State established a process to facilitate meetings between the
Forestry Department (State) and the Maya communities near prospective logging
concessions. But the Maya claim that this process was too little too late and did not
cure the absence of any consultation prior to the logging that occurred and
continues to occur.
In late 1997, the petitioners learned that the States had approved an application
by a company to engage in oil exploration activities in an area that includes most if
not all of the Maya villages in the Toledo District. Under Belize law, any contract for
petroleum operations guarantees oil extraction rights which may continue for a
period of 25 years. The petitioners, therefore, reason that Belize has handed over a
substantial portion of Maya traditional territory to potential long-term oil activities
without any regard for Maya traditional land tenure.
The petitioners further argue that the logging concessions have been put into
effect and cause and will continue to cause similar damage. The logging concessions
cover critical parts of the natural environment upon which the Maya depend for
subsistence, including vulnerable soils, primary forest growth and important
watersheds. The petitioners also claim that the logging activities have affected
essential water supplies, disrupted plant and animal life, and, accordingly, affected
Maya hunting, fishing and gathering practices that are essential to Maya cultural and
physical survival.
Thus the petitioners claim that the logging activities in the Toledo District
threaten long term and irreversible damage to the natural environment upon which
the Maya depend. This includes top soil erosion, which occurs when land is stripped
of forest cover, which impairs the ability of the forest to regenerate. This would
injure the Maya's rotational system of farming and could permanently diminish the
availability of wildlife and plant resources. This could also permanently damage
stream flows that are vital to water supplies, which could cause siltation, which
threatens coastal areas.
Lack of Recognition and Adequate Protection of Indigenous Rights
The petitioners claim that Belize Government officials have uniformly refused to
recognise Maya rights or interests in lands on the basis of Maya customary land use
and occupancy. Instead, the Government has narrowly interpreted Maya interests in
lands and resources. The petitioners claim that the reservation system established by
the Belize Government provides inadequate protection of Maya customary land
tenure. Only half of Maya villages fall within the reservations and those lands are
deemed 'National Lands' and so under the discretionary authority of the
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Government with no specific guarantees for Maya interests. The State has
acknowledged in the past that the Maya people have rights to land and resources
in Southern Belize and they also claim to have aboriginal rights to land under
common law (but argue that international law and not domestic law is ultimately
determinative of the existence/scope of Maya rights for purposes of these
proceedings).
The petitioners also claim there has been an unreasonable delay in domestic
proceedings.
Legal Arguments of the Petitioners
Petitioners argue that the environmental damage caused by the logging concessions
in the Toledo District have undermined Maya food sources and threaten to
contaminate the soils and waters which would adversely affect the health of the
Maya. The Petitioners further claim that Belize is unwilling or unable to enforce
environmental norms against these logging and oil practices and has actually
facilitated the environmental threats. Belize, therefore, has failed to meet its
obligation to guard against the degradation of the natural environment upon which
Maya physical and cultural survival depend.
In relation to the logging and oil concessions, the petitioners allege that the
State of Belize has violated the following human rights of the Maya people: the right
to property (Article XXIII); the right to religious freedom (Article III); right to
family and protection thereof (Article VI); the right to take part in the cultural life of
the community; and their right to a healthy environment in connection with the
right to life (Article I); right to preservation of health and well-being (Article XI);
and the right to participate in government (Article XX). In relation to the failure of
the Belize Government to recognise and secure Maya territorial rights, the
petitioners claim the State violated the Maya people's rights to equality (Article
II), and right to property (Article XXIII) and general principles of international law.
The petitioners claim that both the proposed American Declaration of Indigenous
Peoples and the draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the
Rio Declaration acknowledge the need for States to protect the natural environ-
ments upon which indigenous people depend.
Petitioners state that the right to property in Article XXIII provides for the right
to own such property as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to
maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home, which requires recognition
and protection of the forms of individual and collective landholding and resource
use of the customary land tenure system of the Maya. The petitioners further claim
that the Maya peoples' property rights are additionally reflected in several draft and
final international instruments concerning the rights of indigenous peoples,
including Article XVIII of the proposed American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Article 26 of the Draft United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and Article 14(1) of the International Labour
Organisation's Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. These rights are
further violated in the State's granting of concessions without any consideration of
Maya rights, without Maya consent and without compensation or mitigation for the
adverse impacts
The petitioners claim their right to cultural integrity is violated. The petitioners
claim that Maya land and resource use is the core of Maya culture and is imperilled
by resource extraction activities in the Toledo district without any consideration or
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protection of the Maya cultural patterns, which is in violation of Article 27 of the
ICCPR (right to cultural integrity).
Petitioners also contend that the substantial environmental harm threatens the
Mayan's right to life under Article I; and the right to preservation of health and well-
being, under Article XI of the American Declaration.
Finally, the Petitioners contend that the Government has failed to consult with
the Maya in the Toledo District about these logging and oil concessions in violation
of the 'right to consultation'. The right to be consulted in a meaningful way about
any decision that may affect Maya interests in lands and natural resources is implicit
in the human rights provisions that protect these interests, including Article 27 of
the ICCPR, the right to participate in government, under Article XX of the
American Declaration, and the principle of self-determination, which, according to
the petitioners, is a general principal of international law. The petitioners also rely
on Articles XIII and XVI of the proposed American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples and ILO Convention which the claim clarify the right of
indigenous peoples to consultation. This consultation, the petitioners argue,
requires that indigenous people be provided a fair opportunity to be heard and to
genuinely influence the decisions before them.
The petitioners argue that meaningful consultations with the Maya have not
been held in relation to the logging and oil concessions. Instead, most of the
concessions were granted without public knowledge and without direct consultation
with the affected Maya communities. Further, any public meetings that were held
were held with vague and incomplete information and that any attempt by the Maya
to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the Government have been rebuffed, all
resulting in a denial of the Maya right to consultation.
The petitioners argue that the legal system of Belize does not recognise Maya
customary land tenure as a source of property rights, and the State does not
otherwise provide adequate protection for Maya cultural and subsistence practices
related to land and resources. The failure to recognise these rights is a form of
discrimination that is prohibited under Article II of the American Declaration. The
bodies of the UN recognise that indigenous people have historically suffered
discrimination. One of the greatest manifestations of this discrimination is the
failure of governments to recognise indigenous customary forms of possession and
land use. The petitioners argue that this pattern of discrimination cannot be allowed
to continue and that States have an obligation to eradicate this kind of
discrimination. The petitioners assert that the Maya of the Toledo District have
suffered this very form of discrimination by failing to recognise the Maya land and
resource rights. At a minimum, the petitioners argue that the Government is
obligated to adopt legislation or other measures to identify the geographic extent of
Maya traditional lands and specifically define their legal attributes in accordance
with Maya customs. The petitioners cite a 2001 case before the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights as precedent, Awas Tingnivs Nicaragua, where the Court found that
the indigenous people had a property right under international human rights law
and that the State of Nicaragua had violated their rights by failing to demarcate and
otherwise secure land for the indigenous people and by failing to consultation or
agreement with the community.
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State's Failure to Provide judicial Protection
The petitioners also claim that the State of Belize has failed to provide effective
judicial protection for Maya rights, in violation of Article XVIII, because the Maya
people have tried but failed to obtain redress through the domestic courts. The
petitioners filed an action with the Supreme Court of Belize alleging violations of
constitutionally-protected rights to property and equality. But the Supreme Court
failed to take action on the motion 1.5 years after it was filed. (Petitioners note that
timeliness is essential where alleged human rights violations are ongoing and
possibly irreparable).
The domestic remedies have proven ineffective at protecting Maya rights.
Despite the time that has passed and the substantial evidence submitted to the Belize
Supreme Court, the court has not made any determination on the matter and it has
an international obligation to do so.
Position of the State
The State first argues that there was a process of negotiation that took place outside
the Commission which resulted in the 'Ten-Points Agreement' signed by the parties
on 12 October 2000. The State argues that this agreement became the new basis for
the resolution of the claim. The State further argues that the petitioners acted
prematurely in moving ahead with their litigation before the Commission while
these negotiations were outstanding and the Ten-Point Agreement had not yet been
implemented.
The State also emphasises that the issue of land and resource use in Toledo is
extremely complex; there are at least four ethnic groups and extreme ethnic
diversity in close proximity. Negotiations are therefore very sensitive. The State cites
the principal of equality in Article II and argues that it must consider the interests of
all its citizens and maintain its neutrality.
The State argues that any decision on the merits of the petition must first answer
the question of whether the Maya of Toledo have aboriginal rights in the land of the
Toledo District and that any decision on this issue must be taken based on the
common law and all relevant domestic litigation.
The State disagrees with the petitioners over what the appropriate test is for
determining whether there exist aboriginal rights. The State advocates for a four
part test: (1) that the applicants and their ancestors were members of an organised
society; (2) that the organised society occupied the specific territory over which they
assert the aboriginal title; (3) that the occupation was to the exclusion of other
organised societies; and (4) that the occupation was an established fact at the time
sovereignty was asserted. The State claims that this test differs from the test preferred
by the petitioners: (1) the existence of a culturally distinctive community or society
with historical origins that predate the effective exercise of sovereignty by the
Government; and (2) customary or traditional land tenure or resource use that can
be identified as part of the cultural life of the community or society. The State argues
that it is unclear whether the facts asserted by the petitioners are sufficient to
establish the elements required to recognise aboriginal rights. Specifically, the State
argues that the petitioners failed to prove that the Maya occupied the region
exclusively and continuously.
With respect to the logging concessions and oil explorations, the State argues
that it has taken into account the concerns of the Belizean public, including the
Maya people of Toledo, in a way consistent with a respect for those concerns. The
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State further contends that the petitioners have failed to provide evidence that the
actions and omissions complained of have actually resulted in the alleged violations
of their rights to life, property, cultural integrity, a healthy environment, and
consultation or equality before the law. Specifically, the Maya have never been
removed or threatened with removal, they continue to live in their customary way,
and that the Maya are treated the same as other Belizean communities.
In regard to the allegation of a violation of the right to judicial protection, the
State contends that the petitioners have chosen not to pursue domestic litigation to
its fullest. As of the date of the State's preliminary response, the petitioners were still
availing themselves of domestic avenues for resolution. The State also notes that the
justice system is working on resolving the problems of delays in the courts.
Analysis
Human rights principles recognise the need for special measures by States to
compensate for the exploitation and discrimination of indigenous populations. The
Inter-American Commission recognises and promotes respect for the rights of
indigenous peoples. The notion of special protection for indigenous populations
has been recognised and applied for many rights recognised under the American
Declaration and the American Convention on Human Rights, including the right to
life, humane treatment, right to judicial protection, right to a fair trial, and right to
property. In deciding the complaints, the Commission considers the norms and
principles of international human rights law governing the interest of indigenous
people.
Property
The Commission determined that the Maya people demonstrated a communal
property right to the lands they inhabit in the Toledo District due to their
longstanding use and occupancy of the territory, which the parties agreed pre-dated
European colonialisation and extended to the use of the land and its resources for
purposes relating to the physical and cultural survival of the Maya communities.
The Commission noted that the State did not submit any independent evidence
to support their claim that the Maya have not historically inhabited the Toledo
District and have not exercised collective property rights.
The Commission took into account the State's admission in the Ten-Point
Agreement, along with the State's more general recognition of the long-standing
presence of the Maya people in the Toledo District, which constitutes sufficient
evidence of an enduring connection between the Maya people and lands in the
Toledo District. The State raised doubts about the continuity of Maya occupation
based on the establishment dates of certain specific villages, but the use and
occupancy of territory by the Maya extends beyond the settlement of specific villages
to include lands used for agriculture, fishing, gathering, etc. This is not alone
determinative or fatal to the existence of Maya communal property rights.
As the Commission established that the Maya do have a communal property
right, it is subject to protection under Article XXIII of the American Declaration.
The Maya people's communal property right has an autonomous meaning and
foundation under international law and the Maya property right is not dependent
upon any interpretations of domestic judicial decisions.
As the Commission determined that the Maya have a communal right to
property under Article XXIII, the State has a correspondent obligation to guarantee
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the enjoyment of this right. This obligation requires the State to effectively delimit
and demarcate the territory to which the Maya people's property right extends and
to take the appropriate measures to protect the right of the Maya people in their
territory, including official recognition of that right. This also necessarily includes
engaging in informed consultations with the Maya people regarding their own
boundaries.
The present system of land titling, leasing and permitting under Belizean law
does not adequately recognise or protect the communal rights of the Maya people.
The regime governing private property does not take into account or recognise the
traditional collective system of property ownership and use of the Maya.
Furthermore, the boundaries of the reservations are unclear and do not include
all Mayan communities. It is also apparent that under domestic legislation,
ownership of the reservation lands lie within the State as 'national lands' and there
are not provisions recognising or protecting Maya interest in those lands.
The Commission therefore concluded that the State had violated the Mayan
peoples' right to property under Article XXIII.
Granting of Concessions in the Toledo District
The Commission considered that the right to use and enjoy property may be
impeded when the State itself or third parties acting with the acquiescence or
tolerance of the State, affect the existence, value use or enjoyment of that property
without due consideration of and informed consultations with those having rights in
the property. Other human rights bodies have repeatedly found that a State's
issuance of natural resource concessions to third parties that on ancestral territory of
indigenous people contravenes the rights of the affected indigenous communities.
The Commission further observed that one of the central elements of the
protection of indigenous property rights is the requirement that States undertake
effective and fully informed consultations with indigenous communities regarding
acts or decisions that may affect their traditional territories. Articles XVIII and XXIII
of the American Declaration require a State to make decisions regarding the
interests of indigenous claimants in their lands with the fully informed consent of
the indigenous population and to give the indigenous population an opportunity to
participate. In the Commission's view, these requirements are equally applicable to a
State's decision that will impact indigenous lands and their communities, such as the
granting of concession to exploit the natural resources of indigenous territories.
Here, the Commission found that the State granted logging and oil concessions
to third parties to utilise property and resources that were within the traditional
lands of the Maya people and that the State failed to take adequate measures to
consult with the Maya people concerning these concessions. There is no evidence
that the State conducted effective consultations with the Maya indigenous
communities prior to granting these concessions. While, in the case of one logging
license, the State required the third party to provide evidence of consultation with
the communities likely to be affected, the State did not prescribe clear standards for
these consultations or the extend of community support necessary to permit a
license to be issued.
The Commission therefore concludes that the State violated the right to
property guaranteed in Article XXIII to the detriment of the Maya people by
granting logging and oil concessions within traditional Maya lands without
adequately consulting with the Maya people.
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Furthermore, the Commission noted that the Mayan land has suffered
environmental damage of critical parts of the natural environment upon which
the Maya people depend as a result of the concessions. The petitioners presented
evidence that the concessions have affected important water supplies, disrupted
plant life and animal life and as a result, affected Maya hunting, fishing and
gathering practices essential to Maya cultural and physical survival. The State,
however, claimed that this evidence was 'anecdotal' and presented no evidence to
contradict it.
Consequently, the Commission found that the State's failure to respect the
communal property right of the Maya people has been exacerbated by
environmental damage and has affected the Maya communities.
Right to Equality
The Commission noted that the principle of non-discrimination is a particularly
important protection that permeates all other rights and freedoms under domestic
and international law. It is prescribed in Article II of the American Declaration and
Articles 1(1) and 24 of the American Convention. Article II of the American
Declaration states that all persons are equal before the law, without distinction as to
race, sex, language, creed or any other factor. Article 3 of the Constitution of Belize
similarly provides for the rights to equality in the guarantee of fundamental rights
and freedoms, including property rights. The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights recently expressed similar views on the fundamental nature of the right to
equality and non-discrimination. Furthermore, the preamble to the Belize
Constitution has recently been amended to explicitly recognise that the State must
institute polices that protect the identity, dignity, and social and cultural values of
Belizeans, including indigenous people. This is consistent with the State's
recognition that the Maya represent 47 percent of the population of Belize and
illustrates that the State has taken measures to comply with its obligation to
guarantee equal protection.
But as with all fundamental rights and freedoms, it is not enough for States to
provide equal protection in its law. The State must also take the legislative, policy or
other measures necessary to ensure the effective enjoyment of these rights. The
State of Belize has therefore not fully complied with its obligations under Article II
of the American Declaration by failing to establish the legal mechanisms necessary
to clarify and protect the communal property right of the Maya people.
The Commission observed that the right to equality before the law does not
mean that the substantive provisions of the law will be the same for everyone but that
the application of the law should be equal for all without discrimination. The
protection is designed to ensure equality, not identity of treatment. With regard to
indigenous peoples, various international studies have concluded that indigenous
peoples have historically suffered racial discrimination, and that one of the greatest
manifestations of this discrimination has been the failure of State authorities to
recognise indigenous customary forms of possession and use of lands.
In this case, the Commission concluded that the Maya communities of southern
Belize constitute a distinct group in the Toledo District which warrants special
protection from the State. The State has not established the legal mechanisms
necessary to clarify and protect the communal property right of the Maya people.
While the State has recognised that the Maya people have rights to the lands and
resources on southern Belize, it has still failed to take the necessary steps to clearly
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guarantee those rights, which has created a climate of uncertainty for the Maya
communities. Accordingly, the State of Belize has violated the right to equality
before the law, equal protection of the law and to non-discrimination enshrined in
Article II of the American Declaration to the detriment of the Maya people of the
Toledo district by failing to provide them with protections necessary to exercise their
right to property fully and equal to other members of the Belizean population.
Right to judicial Protection
The right to judicial protection, enshrined in Article XVIII of the American
Declaration provides that every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for
his legal rights and there should be a simple, brief procedure whereby the courts will
protect individuals from acts of authority that violate a person's fundamental
constitutional rights. This right is also affirmed in Article 25 of the American
Convention on Human Rights.
The Commission has found that the lack of an effective judicial remedy implies,
notjust an exception to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, but also a violation of
the substantive right to judicial protection which is upheld by the inter-American
human rights system. The inter-American system has also established that an
essential element of effectiveness is timeliness. The right to judicial protection
requires courts to adjudicate and decide cases expeditiously, particularly urgent
cases. In this regard, three factors are to be considered in determining what time-
frame is reasonable for ajudicial proceeding: (a) the complexity of the case; (b) the
procedural activity of the interested party; and (c) the conduct of the judicial
authorities.
In 1996, the petitioners filed a motion for constitutional redress in the Supreme
Court of Belize seeking an order declaring, inter alia, the existence and nature of
Maya interests in the land an resources and the status of those interests as rights
protected under the Constitution, as well as declarations of violations of those rights
and interests by the government because of the licenses to log within Maya
traditional lands. In 1998, the petitioners also filed a motion for interlocutory relief
where they requested an immediate injunction against the Minister of Natural
Resources restraining the Minister from granting additional logging concessions or
other concessions for resource extractions. But despite this urgency, the hearing for
the motion was adjourned at the request of the Attorney General's office and has not
been rescheduled. And the Court still has not taken any action on this motion for
interlocutory relief or on any aspect of the merits of the main litigation. The
Government, furthermore, has not repeatedly failed to meet the court issued
procedures and deadlines established for this litigation.
The State argues that the petitioners have chosen not to pursue domestic
litigation to its fullest (the petitioners could petition the Chief Justice of Belize for
an early hearing on the basis of urgency) and also argues that the petitioners have
availed themselves of domestic avenues for resolution by engaging in negotiations
with the Government. But the Commission noted that a State's obligation to provide
effective judicial remedies is not fulfilled simply by the existence of courts or formal
procedures, or even by the ability to resort to the courts. Rather, a State must take
affirmative steps to ensure that the remedies provided by the State through its courts
are truly effective in establishing whether there has been a violation of human rights
and in providing redress.
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The Commission indicated that as of the date of this report, almost eight years
have past since the motion for constitutional relief were initiated and over five years
have passed sine the motion for emergency interlocutory relief was lodged. Still, not
decision has resulted. While the Commission acknowledged that the subject matter
of the case raised complex matters of fact and law that may reasonably require some
delay in litigating and some of the delay is attributable to the parties attempt to
reach an amicable settlement, there is no evidence that the settlement negotiations
had the effect of suspending the litigation. It is also apparent that the lack of
progress is largely a result of the State's failure to comply with certain procedural
requirements as well as a systematic delay that is inherent in the civil justice system
generally. Accordingly, the Commission found that an unreasonable delay has been
demonstrated. The State of Belize has violated the right to judicial protection
enshrined in Article XVIII of the American Declaration to the detriment of the Maya
people.
Subsequent Proceedings
On 30 October 2003, the Commission requested that the State of Belize inform the
Commission within 60 days of the measures it planned to adopt to comply with the
recommendations made to resolve the situation. The State of Belize replied with a
request that the Commission publicise this report to 'ensure its customary
transparency and widest dissemination as it begins consultation on this matter'.
The Commission granted the request. The Commission has received no further
response from the State within the 60-day period.
Recommendations
The Commission requested the State of Belize to adopt in its domestic law, and
through fully informed consultations with the Maya people, the legislative,
administrative and any other measures necessary to delimit, demarcate and title
or otherwise clarify and protect the territory in which the Maya people have a
communal property right, in accordance with their customary land use practices and
without detriment to other indigenous communities.
The Commission requested the State to delimit, demarcate and title or otherwise
clarify and protect the corresponding lands of the Maya people without detriment to
other indigenous communities and, until those measures have been carried out,
abstain from any acts that might lead the agents of the State itself or third parties to
affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of the property used and occupied by
the Maya people.
The Commission requested that the Sate repair the environmental damage
resulting from the logging concessions granted in the Maya territory.
Whitley Myrie, Jamaica, Case 12.417, Report No. 41/04, Merits, 12 October 2004
Background
On 22 October 2001, a firm of solicitors in London filed a petition against the
Government ofJamaica on behalf of Mr. Whitley Myrie, who is serving a life sentence
in a Jamaica prison. Mr. Myrie was convicted of capital murder by the St. James
Circuit Court in Kingston, Jamaica and sentenced to death. The Court of Appeal of
Jamaica subsequently classified the murder as non-capital and reduced his sentence
to life imprisonment with a minimum term without parole of 15 years.
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According to the prosecution's case, Mr. Myrie, with three other individuals,
killed Dennis Grubb on 11 August 1990 when Mr. Grubb and his wife returned
home from a party. The prosecution's main witness was Ms. Barrett who testified that
on the night of the murder, she saw Mr. Myrie with a machete and testified that she
heard Mr. Myrie and his co-defendants speaking about a fight with Mr. Grubb.
According to the police evidence at trial, Mr. Myrie provided a statement to the
police and was cautioned before the statement was taken. The trial judge found that
the statement was voluntary and admissible and was consequently read to the jury. In
the statement, Mr. Myrie said that on the evening of the murder, as he was leaving a
party, Mr. Grubb threatened him and slashed him with a machete. Mr. Myrie ran
back to the party to find a District Constable but the only person he could find was
Widcliffe Willams. So Mr. Myrie told him what happened and then went back up the
road where he saw Mr. Grubb again who was holding a machete. Mr. Grubb tried to
hit Mr. Myrie but slipped and Mr. Myrie grabbed the machete. Mr. Myrie then gave
Mr. Grubb a 'couple of chops' and then ran home with the machete. The petitioners
also claim that during the trial, Mr. Myrie gave an unsworn statement in which he
stated, 'Dennis attacked me with a machete and he and I got into a collusion, and I
have to defend myself.
The petitioners allege that the State violated Mr. Myrie's rights under Articles 1,
4, 5, 8, 12, 24 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights because of the
conditions of his detention during the course of his criminal proceedings, the
failure of the State to protect against irregularities in Mr. Myrie's trial, and the
failure to make legal aid available to pursue a Constitutional Motion in the domestic
courts in connection with his criminal proceedings.
The State did not provide any observations on the merits of the Petitioner's
petition.
Positions of the Parties - Petitioners
Right to Humane Treatment
The petitioners first allege that the State is responsible for violations of Mr. Myrie's
right to human treatment contrary to Articles 5(1), 5(2) and 5(4) of the Convention
due to his conditions of detention while in custody at the police station and at
various penitentiaries. The petitioners provide evidence concerning the nature and
quality of basic accommodations, hygiene, and medical treatment. While in custody
at the police station for 3 months, Mr. Myrie was detained in a small cramped cell
with other individuals, provided with poor quality food that was often inedible, and
denied the opportunity to exercise. The conditions of the cell, moreover, were
unsanitary and foul smelling. While at another prison for 10 months, Mr. Myrie was
confined to a small cramped passageway with other prisoners because there were no
cells available. The passageway was hot, without ventilation, without proper
sanitation facilities and was therefore foul smelling, and contained bugs, food
scraps and excretions. Mr. Myrie was forced to sleep on the floor without any
bedding and a hose was his only washing facility. He was not given the opportunity to
exercise and the food was inedible so he often went without eating. The petitioners
claim that Mr. Myrie suffered from poor health and it was difficult to see a doctor
and family visits were extremely limited. He was furthermore prohibited from
making any phone calls and there were no educational facilities or books.
All of the prison facilities where Mr. Myrie lived reveal similar conditions. And
while on death row, Mr. Myrie was also subjected to mental and physical torture, as
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he suffered from nightmares, anxiousness, sleeplessness and depression. The
petitioners also state that there was no adequate mechanism for dealing with
prisoner complaints.
The petitioners emphasise the standards of treatment under Article 5 apply
regardless of the nature of the offence for which the individual concerned is
imprisoned and do not depend on the level of development of the detaining State.
In support of this claim the petitioners citeJamaica's own rules regarding treatment
of detained persons as well as the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners. Based upon these factual and legal observations, the
Petitioners conclude that the State is responsible for infringing on Mr. Myrie's
physical and mental integrity and subjecting him to cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment in violation of Article 5 of the Convention.
Right to a Fair Trial
The petitioners also contend that the State has violated Mr. Myrie's right to a fair
trial under Article 8 of the Convention. The Petitioners first argue that Mr. Myrie was
convicted based upon evidence that was improperly obtained, because he was forced
to give a signed confession under threat which was subsequently used as evidence at
trial. (Mr. Myrie was poked 3 times with a stick).
Next, the petitioners argue that the State violated Article 8 when the judge
allowed the jury to remain present during the hearing to determine whether Mr.
Myrie's statement was voluntary and therefore admissible.
Thejudge further instructed the jury that they could rely on the confession even
if they determined that it was involuntarily given. Furthermore, the petitioners argue
that Mr. Myrie was denied a fair hearing because the trial judge erred in giving
reasons in the presence of the jury why there was insufficient evidence for a case
against the co-defendants. This, the petitioners argue, could have prejudiced the
jury by giving them the impression that there was, therefore, sufficient evidence
against Mr. Myrie.
The petitioners also argue that the trial judge erred in allowing the trial to
continue in the absence of Mr. Myrie's trial attorney, contrary to Article 8(1) and
(2) (d) of the Convention. The failure of the trialjudge to postpone the trial to allow
Mr. Myrie's attorney to be present constituted a material irregularity that led to
seriously damaging evidence going unchallenged. The petitioners also claim that
this irregularity was obvious to the court and Mr. Myrie was therefore deprived of
proper representation during his trial, contrary to Article 8 of the Convention.
Additionally, the petitioners argue that the trial judge decided not to allow the
character of the deceased to be examined and that this decision seriously harmed
Mr. Myrie's self-defence claim that he feared for his own life.
Finally, the petitioners contend that the incompetence of Mr. Myrie's trial
counsel deprived Mr. Myrie of a fair trial. The performance of Mr. Myrie's counsel
fell far below the standard required for counsel defending a murder trial under the
Jamaican Constitution. (Counsel was often absent, he asked for the jury to be
present during the hearing on the admissibility of Mr. Myrie's statement, and did
not pursue the issue of the deceased's violent character.)
Right to judicial Protection
The petitioners argue that Mr. Myrie has been denied access to a court and denied
an effective remedy for violations of the Constitution ofJamaica and the American
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Convention contrary to Article 24 and 25 of the Convention, by denying him the
ability to seek, on an equal basis, simple and prompt recourse to a competent court
or tribunal for protection against violation of his fundamental rights. While the
Jamaica Constitution gives any person the right to apply to the Supreme Court for
Redress, but due to a lack of funds, this is not a right of access that Mr. Myrie can
exercise, as Jamaica does not provide legal aid to prisoners.
Analysis
Conditions of Detention
The Commission considered whether the conditions described by Mr. Myrie disclose
violations of the State's obligations under Article 5 of the Convention not to subject
Mr. Myrie to inhumane treatment. The Commission assessed the details of Mr.
Myrie's conditions in light of previous decisions of this commission and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, where similar standards were found to violate
Article 5. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners is a reliable benchmark, provides, for example, that: prisoners' sleeping
arrangements shall be healthy, with due regard for space, climactic conditions,
lighting, heating and ventilation; the sanitary installations shall be adequate to
enable every prisoner to comply with the needs of nature when necessary and in a
clean and decent manner; prisoners shall be given at least one hour of suitable
exercise. Mr. Myrie's subjection to crowded, unhygienic confinement spaces,
improper nutrition, denial of exercise, reading or educational facilities, as well as
the torture he endured by the State during prison rights, coupled with the length of
time of Mr. Myrie's confinement, clearly violate these minimum standards and
Article 5. This constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
and the Commission finds the State responsible for these violations.
Right to a Fair Trial
First, in evaluating the petitioners' contentions concerning the admissibility of Mr.
Myrie's statement and the conduct of the trial judge, the Commission considered
that it is generally left for the appellate courts of States Parties, and not the
Commission, to review the manner in which a trial was conducted, unless it is clear
that the judge's conduct was arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, or the
judge manifestly violated his obligation to impartiality. There is no information on
the record indicating that the trial judge's decision to admit the statement was
arbitrary or was otherwise characterised as a denial of justice. The Commission,
therefore, found no grounds upon which to establish a violation of Article 8 in
regard to the use of Mr. Myrie's statement at trial.
In regard to the other aspects of the judge's manner of conducting Mr. Myrie's
trial, the Commission found a denial of justice in two respects. The first is the fact
that the trialjudge allowed the hearing on the admissibility of Mr. Myrie's statement
to be held in the presence of thejury. This is inconsistent with established domestic
jurisprudence requiring the absence of ajury during this type of hearing in order to
avoid unfair prejudice, with no apparent justification for the irregularity. The
second violation is the trial judge's continuation of the trial during periods when
Mr. Myrie's attorney was absent. It should have been evident to the trial judge that
continuing with the trial in the absence of Mr. Myrie's attorney would potentially
prejudice Mr. Myrie and deprive him of his right to effective representation. On this
basis, the Commission found that Mr. Myrie suffered a denial of justice as a
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consequence of the manner in which the trial judge conducted his proceedings,
contrary to Article 8(1) and 8(2).
The Commission found further violations of Articles 8(1) and 8(2) in regard to
Mr. Myrie's ineffective legal representation. According to Article 8(2) (d) provides
every person accused of a criminal offense an inalienable right to be assisted by
counsel provided by the State. This is a particularly fundamental right in the case of
capital offences. Here, while the State did provide Mr. Myrie with legal representa-
tion, the right to legal representation must be guaranteed in a manner that renders
it effective and therefore requires not only that counsel be provided, but that
counsel be competent in representing the defendant. National authorities are
required under Article 8(2) (c) to intervene if a failure by legal counsel to provide
representation is manifest or sufficiently brought to their attention. While Mr. Myrie
did not make it known that he considered his counsel ineffective, the defence
counsel's inadequacy should have been manifest to the trial judge as his behaviour
was incompatible with the interests ofjustice. In particular, the defence counsel did
not request that the jury leave for the hearing on the admissibility of Mr. Myrie's
statement, as he should have, but actually requested that the jury be present. And his
excessive absence from the court room for important portions of the trial should
also have alerted the judge to the defence counsel's incompetence.
The Commission considered that these serious violations of due process should
be considered to have deprived Mr. Myrie's criminal proceedings of their efficacy
and should therefore invalidate his conviction.
Right to judicial Protection
The issues raised by Mr. Myrie in this proceeding are sufficiently complex that they
cannot be effectively raised or presented before a domestic court in the absence of
legal representation. Furthermore, Mr. Myrie lacks the financial means to hire an
attorney andJamaica does not provide legal aid to prisoners. Accordingly, pursuant
to Articles 24 and 25, the State is obliged under the American Convention to provide
individuals with effected access to Constitutional Motions which in certain
circumstances, as in this case, require the provision of legal assistance. The
Commission considered that by not providing legal aid to Mr. Myrie, the State has
effectively barred his recourse to a competent court or tribunal in Jamaica, in
violation of Articles 25, 8 and 1(1).
Proceedings Subsequent to Report 32/02
On 27 October 2003, the Commission transmitted Report No. 50/03 to the State,
and requested that the Government of Jamaica inform the Commission within two
months as to the measures adopted to comply with the recommendations mad to
resolve the situation denounced. The Commission did not receive a response.
Recommendations
1. Grant Mr. Myrie an effective remedy, which includes a re-trial in accordance
with the due process protections prescribed under Article 8 of the Convention,
or where re-trial is not possible, his release and compensation.
2. Adopt legislative or other measures to ensure that Mr. Myrie's conditions of
detention comply with international standards of humane treatment under
Article 5.
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3. Adopt legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the right
to judicial protection under Article 25 of the Convention and the right to a fair
hearing under Article 8(1) of the Convention are given effect in Jamaica in
relation to recourse to Constitutional Motions.
Elias Santana et al., Venezuela, Petition 453/01, Report No. 92/03, Inadmissibility,
23 October 2003
Background
Article 14 of the Convention provides that anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive
statements or ideas disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated
medium of communication has the right to reply or to make a correction using the
same communications outlet, under such conditions as the law may establish.
On 27 August 2000, the President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez Frias, publicly
ridiculed and criticised the ideas of Elias Santana, a political figure who ran a non
profit group, Queremos Eligir that advocated for a broader role in government. The
President made these remarks on his own radio programme, 'Alo Presidente'. As a
result, Elias Santana, who was also a radio broadcaster who hosted his own
programme, requested that the Director of the 'Independent National Radio
Institute of Venezuela' give Santana the opportunity to exercise his right of
correction or reply to respond to the President's remarks. The Director of the
National Radio Institute gave Santana the right through three of the National Radio
Institute's broadcasting networks. Santana, however refused, and instated on
exercising his right of reply on the same programme, stations and time that the
President made his remarks. The National Radio Institute refused.
On 9 October 2000, Elias Santana thus brought an appeal for constitutional
protection, acting on his own behalf and as General Coordinator for the association
Queremos Elegir, before the President and other magistrates of the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal ofJustice. On 12 July 2001, the Constitutional
Chamber decided Judgement 1013, to reject the appeal for constitutional
protection as inadmissible in limine litis, on the grounds that, in accordance with
Venezuelan Law, Mr. Santana had been granted his right of correction or reply.
Admissibility
The Commission considered whether the allegations of Mr. Santana constitute a
violation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention in light of the State's
arguments that (1) Mr. Santana was granted the right of a correction or reply within
domestic jurisdiction and (2) that the right of correction or reply did not apply
because what was involved was an opinion and not factual affirmations.
The Commission noted that there is controversy surrounding the scope
accorded to the right of reply as it relates to the freedom of expression. One
viewpoint is that the right of reply limits freedom of expression because it obliges the
media to provide free coverage for information that is not necessarily consistent with
its editorial line, while another viewpoint maintains that the right of reply
strengthens freedom of expression by fostering a greater flow of information.
The Commission considered that Article 14(1) of the Convention guarantees the
right of reply through the same medium of communication, under the conditions
established by law. The Commission noted that Article 14(1) does not indicate
whether the beneficiaries of Right to Correction or Reply are entitled to an equal or
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greater amount of space, when the reply must be published, within what time frame
the right can be exercised, etc. Under Article 14, these conditions are 'such as the law
may establish', i.e., domestic law.
Here the Commission noted that Article 58 of the Venezuelan Constitution
provides for a right of reply and correction for anyone affected by inaccurate or
offensive information. Article 9 of the Law on the Exercise of Journalism also
declares that any distortion or untruthfulness in information must be corrected in a
timely and effective manner - the journalist is obliged to correct it and the company
to accommodate such a correction. Mr. Santana was granted the right to reply
through three Broadcasting companies, belonging to the National Radio Institute of
Venezuela, the same medium that the President used to broadcast his allegedly
offensive comments. However, Mr. Santana refused to have his opinion broadcast
under these conditions, and insisted that it should be on the same program, at the
same time with the same coverage. This does not amount to a violation of Mr.
Santana's Article 14 right to reply.
Additionally, the Commission agreed with the State argument that the
President's comments were merely political opinion, with no factual basis. In
accordance with Article 14, the right of reply or correction exists only in relation to
information of a factual nature and not to commentary or opinion. The English
version of Article 14 provides the right of reply or correction for statements or ideas,
but the other French, Spanish, and Portuguese versions do not. The Commission
concluded that these latter versions that exclude mere ideas from recourse under
Article 14, are correct because the broader wording of Article 13, which protects
freedom of expression, including ideas, is not echoed in the more narrowly tailored
Article 14, which lead the Commission to conclude that the intention was to exclude
ideas from the right of reply and correction.
In this case, the Commission agreed with the State that the President's comments
were ideas with no factual basis, and Mr. Santana was therefore not entitled to a right
of reply under Article 14.
Other Petitioners
Several other individual journalists argue that they were injured by Judgment 1013
issued by the Supreme Tribunal of Venezuela as it binds interpretation of Articles 57
and 58 of the Venezuelan Constitution. Instead of confining itself to deciding the
personal complaint of Mr. Santana, these petitioners argue that the Supreme
Tribunal injured them directly by establishing that, 'the media and those who
habitually exercise journalism through the media do not have a right of reply, nor
do those who maintain columns or programs in them' which the petitioners claim
makes them victims, as journalists.
But the Commission held that these petitioners did not provide sufficient
evidence to demonstrate the specific manner in which their personal situation was
injured by this portion of the judgement - it is not enough to claim the mere
existence of a law violates her rights under the American Convention, the law must
be applied to her detriment. Furthermore, the petitioners did not bring their cases
to the domestic courts so has not given the State an opportunity to resolve the
complaint. Finally, the paragraphs to which the petitioners referred to are not the
decision but the reasoning behind the decision and it is only the decision that is
binding.
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Decision
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights declared this case inadmissible.
But the Commission indicated its concern about the affect of Judgment 1013 on
Articles 57 and 58 of the Venezuelan Constitution. Accordingly, the Commission
instructed the IACHR's Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression to prepare a
special report onJudgment 1013 and the standards of protection of human rights as
they relate to freedom of expression in the inter-American System.
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